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3

Classics and Conversations

Donald N. Levine

When, as dean of the College in 1982, I convened the symposium inaugurating our explorations of the history of Soc 2, I invited the participants to engage in a little thought experiment. I now repeat my invitation for readers of this volume. Imagine a dark and chilly night on a prairie somewhere in Nebraska. Five figures sit huddled around a fire. Having exhausted their repertoire of campfire songs, they turn to conversation. We see them only dimly, but can hear what they are saying. Their talk turns to comments on the years of violence in Ethiopia—the longstanding Eritrean rebellion, its escalation due to interventions by foreign powers, heightened hostilities among various ethnic groups, the political killings under the old Mengistu regime. As they talk, the conversation shifts to a more general question: the issue of violence and conflict in human relations. One of them comments: "I am not really surprised by all this violence. You see, the conduct of all human animals is energized by powerful instinctual forces, including a strong component of aggressive drives. Since modern civilization inhibits the casual expression of those drives, we must expect that they will become bottled up and intensified to the point that they seek discharge in occasionally explosive forms like war."

"My friend, you are mistaken," comes a voice from the other side of the fire. "Observe the enormous variability of human conduct that appears when one compares different societies. Human beings are basically amorphous, until they are shaped in a particular way by those ideas and values that their culture has selected from the great spectrum of human potentialities. Warlike cultures make people aggressive, pacific cultures make them peaceable."

At this point a figure somewhat off to the side breaks in. "If I may say so," he remarks, "this notion of complete cultural variability overlooks those fundamental patterns of human social life that are inherent in all social interaction. There are fundamental forms that recur whenever people associate, however different their purposes in coming together

may be. And I believe that patterns like conflict are just as essential in human interaction as patterns like cooperation and stratification. Indeed, conflict sometimes is a means by which the cohesiveness of groups actually becomes strengthened."

Suddenly a figure to his left breaks in. "Such naive and obfuscating gibberish! If you could just bring yourself to be realistic, you would acknowledge that conflict is not a necessary component of social relations. It is produced only when societies are divided into social classes unequal in their command of resources. Conflict comes about because of the recurrent struggle among those classes for control of resources, and if there is violence among different nations, that is because their ruling classes are competing for scarce resources. To eliminate conflict, all you need to do is eliminate unequal social classes."

"Well, well," says the fifth figure, who has been taking in everything most attentively, "I must say that that seems to me very simplistic. Human reality is much more complex than your formulas admit. Human actors are moved by a great variety of intentions and organized in countless ways. Different groups compete with one another for different things at different times: now for economic resources, now for political power, now for prestige, now on behalf of those great ideals enunciated by prophets. And because it is impossible to secure harmonious agreement in these diverse areas, there will always be conflict among social strata."

"Aha!" chimes the first speaker. "Have you not just given us what amounts to an elaborate rationalization, one that by intellectualizing the manifestations of human conflict obscures their ultimate origin in largely unconscious aggressive strivings?"

Just then, a large cloud moves westward and uncovers a bright full moon. The faces of our speakers are illuminated and we recognize them—of course—as Sigmund Freud, Ruth Benedict, Georg Simmel, Karl Marx, and Max Weber.

As I did to participants in the 1982 symposium, I ask you now to pause, to take out paper and pencil, and to write a short essay on the following question: how would the recent conflicts in Ethiopia be interpreted by Freud, Benedict, Simmel, Marx, and Weber, and with what arguments would they support those interpretations?

Questions of the sort just posed have provoked, delighted, frustrated, and enlightened many generations of students in the College. In celebrating the organized course of study known as Social Sciences 2 that spawned and today still spawns such questions, we seek no orgy of nostalgia or self-congratulation, but discussions devoted to critical reflection about this pedagogical tradition. This attitude, the only truly

respectful one, is particularly necessary in the context of celebrating the University's centennial.

Whether Soc 2 has a single or multiple birthdates is more a matter of interpretation than is the nativity of the University and of the College as a whole. In chapter 4, David Orlinsky argues that the year 1931, when the grandparent general education course on the institutions of modern society was created by Louis Wirth, Jerome Kerwin, and Harry Gideonse, should be viewed as the true date of origin for the course. Others would suggest that it was 1947, when the staff substantially reoriented the course around the theme of "personality and culture," that the Soc 2 course we know and love really originated. Still others—including those who initially publicized the 1982 symposium as the fortieth anniversary—make the case for 1942, on grounds that it was then that Dean Clarence Faust and the College faculty established an integrated four-year curriculum of general education courses, in which the course became defined as the second-year course in a three-year sequence of social science courses and thereby acquired its generic name of Social Sciences 2.

Given the extent of plausible controversy about the true age of the course, we must conclude that it was less the historian's sense of an identifiable past even that prompted the the 1982 assembly and this centennial volume, than the anthropologist's sense of some significant social function deserving symbolic representation in scenes of collective effervescence. While I would hesitate to hang such an interpretation on one particular reading of the matter, I think it fair to suggest that the contrast between what is happening in American higher education today and the experience in the College of the University of Chicago is a further, major source for these inspirations and efforts. For it is the case that social science programs in American colleges today face a triple threat to their vitality: a growing sense of the poverty of prevailing patterns of curricular organization; a sense of crisis affecting the whole social science enterprise owing both to the reduction of public financial and moral support and a rash of internal identity crises; and a sense that the legitimate educational needs of students have been given short shift. In feverish response thereto, social science educators have been grasping for curricular novelties with which to express a renewed sense of purpose—and to capture headlines and students.

In stunning contrast, the Soc 2 sequence represents an educational program that has proved powerfully effective over a very long time—indeed, for sixty-one (or forty-five, or fifty) years! And so the thought arises that the community of social science educators might find something of interest in a series of reflections about a course and about more

general problems regarding collegiate education in the social sciences by faculty members and former students associated with the course at different points in its history.

To say that some cultural creation has continuing significance as an exemplary work over many generations is in effect to call it a classic. If I am not mistaken, the intellectual mood registered in the essays in this volume is not unlike that we experience when we revisit a literary classic. And just as one of the hallmarks of a classic is its potential for eliciting divergent interpretations from different readers, so the special meaning of the Soc 2 course continues to be formulated in quite different ways. Let me add to the discussion some of my own idiosyncratic views about this curricular classic.

Much of what constitutes the claim of Soc 2 to status as a classic derives from its being part of a classic system of general education initiated by members of our faculty in the mid-1920s and perfected in the mid-1940s. The spirit of that enterprise was aptly conveyed by Louis Wirth, not long after Soc 2's grandparent course was launched in 1931. "It has been agreed," he wrote, "that the object of our college is to provide what we are pleased to call 'a general education.' But if this aim is to emerge out of the vaporizing state and is to be more than a stereotyped shibboleth we shall soon have to devote some thought to its meaning."[1] It is hard to imagine a place where more serious thought was devoted to the meaning of general education than in this College in the 1930s. And in the essay by Wirth from which I have quoted he goes on to express some of the core ideas which animated the general-education program of what is often called the Hutchins College.

In the first place, he says, "General education should not deal with each separate phase of the curriculum as if the student were going to specialize in it. It should, however, clearly exhibit the nature and peculiarities of the subject matter and methods of procedure, and the relation of each subject to all the rest."[2]

In doing this, he adds, it should avoid "the type of course known as the 'survey course,' that offers excursions into every imaginable field and penetrates beneath the surface of scarcely any."[3] This can be accomplished by choosing "one major theme for selective exploitation." College education, Wirth observes, will be "effective only in the measure that it is creative, for we cannot transmit knowledge without in some measure altering what we started to transmit. A culture will, in the

1. Louis Wirth, in *General Education: Its Nature, Scope and Essential Elements,* ed. William S. Gray, Proceedings of the Institute for Administrative Officers of Higher Institutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), 6: 25–35.

2. Ibid., 28.

3. Ibid., 31.

course of time, degenerate into a body of sterile ritual and rigid dogma unless it is refreshed by constant commentary and criticism and by new discovery."[4]

Wirth goes on to comment on the advantages to the faculty of participating in a program of general education.

> Each of us who has participated in the general education courses in the four major fields and in English, through which for the time being we are attempting to set up the groundwork of a general education, has acquired an acquaintance with a number of other disciplines which have extended his range of vision, of interest, and of knowledge. Each of us has at least begun to see interrelationships of which hitherto he was more or less oblivious.[5]

For the students of such a program, finally, he wrote,

> It is largely in the process of acquiring a general acquaintance with our culture that we can hope to discover our special aptitudes and interests and to develop them to the utmost. The purpose of general education is to give to the students who will go on living if not studying after they are graduated a sense of the whole of modern thought which shall be sufficiently ordered and impressive that it will succeed in penetrating into whatever realms of life or thought or science with which they may become preoccupied.[6]

These observations by Wirth may be taken as early expressions of ideas that have long been shared by the members of our College faculty and that were imaginatively realized in those outstanding courses created here in the 1930s and 1940s, of which Soc 2 remains an excellent exemplar. Schematically formulated, these are the notions that: (1) general education should be an *enabling* experience for students, giving them both access to the major fields of human culture and opportunities to discover and cultivate their special aptitudes and interests; (2) general education courses should not be introductions to specialized subject matters, but should provide acquaintance with the basic ideas and methods of different fields and how these related to one another; (3) general education courses should resist the temptation to be comprehensive survey courses, but should afford students depth of understanding by intensive treatment of selected themes or problems; (4) the materials covered in these courses should be presented critically, not

4. Ibid., 28.

5. Ibid., 29.

6. Ibid., 31.

dogmatically, and be related to current frontiers of scholarly inquiry; and (5) the faculty teaching these courses should themselves be stimulated and educated through continuous interaction with colleagues from other disciplines.

My own judgment is that these ideas remain no less valid today than in the past and that those aspiring to be innovators in collegiate education in our time would be well served by considering their relevance to the curricular needs of the 1990s.

Having asserted that what distinguished Soc 2 was its embodiment of notions that informed the College curriculum as a whole, let me relax my former dean's perspective a bit and confess that there was something special about this particular course after all—many things, in fact, of which I shall name only two. Here again, a passage from Louis Wirth's notable essay of 1934 is instructive.

> In the field of the social sciences one of the chief problems we face consists of the fact that students are likely to come to us with the belief that they already have the right answers to all of the important questions with which we deal. . . . This is more true in our field that it is in the physical and biological sciences, and probably in the humanities. The person who has undergone a general education in social science, therefore, probably begins such training with more convictions and ends with fewer convictions about what ought to be done about things than the ignoramus possesses. . . . A major part of our effort consists in making the students aware of their biases and of the presuppositions derived from their cultural heritage with which they come to us.[7]

It is surely the case that the challenge of having to reexamine one's taken-for-granted beliefs about human conduct and the social world has been a central, powerful, and continuous experience both for the students and for the faculty of Soc 2.

No curriculum, however good, teaches itself well. There can be no doubt that the quality of the faculty associated with the course in its formative years was phenomenal. In the late 1940s, when the current orientation of its curriculum was defined, the faculty included an array of truly powerful and creative minds, including Daniel Bell, Reinhard Bendix, Lewis Coser, Joseph Gusfield, Barrington Moore, Benjamin Nelson, Robert Redfield, Philip Rieff, David Riesman, Milton Singer, and Sylvia Thrupp. David Orlinsky, in the following pages, conjectures that "the intellectual force of such a group is overwhelming, and the

7. Ibid., 33.

course they created must have had an unforgettable impact on all who participated in it." I was there—and I can confirm that he is right.

This last observation recalls one other feature of a classic I would like to mention. Classics are not only exemplary and enduring, and evocative of diverse interpretations; they are also *memorable.* They have an impact on our lives at the time we encounter them, and we return intermittently the rest of our lives to recall them and reflect on them. There is no easy way to know just how memorable the experience of the Soc 2 course has been for its tens of thousands of alumni. We do know that dozens, if not hundreds, of the country's leading social scientists have produced work that clearly bears the imprint of their experience here. We also have pretty suggestive indicators in the fact that some 150 alumni of the course from the Chicago area joined us at the 1982 conference, and another two score who could not be here on that occasion phoned or wrote their good wishes. The *University of Chicago Magazine* received some eighty communications in response to its article on the symposium, and Soc 2 faculty members traveling to alumni meetings around the country reported great enthusiasm. One of the letters received in 1982 read as follows.

> Dear Dean Levine:
>
> When I received your letter regarding Social Sciences 2, I thought back to the late forties when I took the course and would briefly like to share my thoughts. Unfortunately I will be out of town at that time so I will be unable to attend but will look forward to the written report.
>
> When I took the course in 1948–49 I wondered what possible benefit it would have for me as a future Finance man and Lawyer. While I enjoyed the reading I couldn't see the reasons. Now some thirty years later it is quite plain to me. It was the courses like Soc 2 which prepared me for finance and law and more importantly made me a better citizen, person, father and husband. I salute the effort to "revisit Social Science 2."
>
> My best wishes for a successful celebration.

Such simple and straightforward expressions offer the weightiest possible testimony to the general education values of courses like Soc 2.

We expect to receive more such communications in response to this centennial volume, but again we do not wish simply to bask in reminiscence and eulogy. Although it is impossible to remove all revivalistic overtones from this book, it will have to be deemed a failure if it does not serve the larger purpose of spurring some genuine inquiry into the constant and varying features of the course and their relationship to the challenge faced by collegiate social science education in our time. The publication

of these essays is intended to expand the conversation beyond Chicago alumni, encouraging ongoing dialogue among social science educators elsewhere.

To that end, I shall pose three questions that may serve to organize such conversations. First, what have been the essential virtues of this course, and what its characteristic shortcomings? Second, what is the contemporary relevance of a course such as Soc 2 both for us locally as we periodically review the College curriculum and for other colleges elsewhere in the world? And finally, how might the participation of faculty from diverse disciplines in a course of this sort stimulate social scientists to undertake more meaningful kinds of inquiries?

The chapters that follow address these questions in varying ways. In concluding this one, I propose to join the debate by taking up an issue that cuts across all three questions: What is the value of classic social science texts in common core curricula?

One of the enduring features of the Soc 2 course has been its extensive reliance on texts that have been glossed as social science classics: works by authors such as Freud, Benedict, Simmel, Marx, and Weber, to whom I referred in the thought experiment with which this chapter opened. Such writings are indeed durable, exemplary, ambiguously stimulating, and memorable—the qualities I listed above when describing the Soc 2 course itself as a curricular classic. Nevertheless, one may rightly ask if these qualities provide sufficient reason to justify including such works in a college course required of all students as an introduction to the types of thinking and research found in the social sciences. Two types of consideration argue against such inclusion.

The first reason is suggested by some very contemporary controversies over the suitability of canonical works in common core curricula. Since, the argument goes (and I fear I know no other way to present it than in what may appear to some readers as a caricature), to say "classics" is to say Great Books of the Western world, and inasmuch as this canon was written exclusively by white males, either it should be supplemented by a proportionate representation of works by nonwhites and females or it should be scrapped as a general requirement.

If the point of such a requirement is to introduce students to insightful formulations regarding human customs and motivations, then of course one could readily find a range of authors outside the universe of white Western males to draw on. If, however, the rationale for the requirement is to introduce students to the intellectual foundations of the social sciences, then one is restricted willy-nilly to the circumscribed universe of chiefly West European white males who created the intellectual capital used to launch the enterprise of the modern social science disciplines. When confronted with the racial/gender makeup of their

classic authors, social science educators may be entitled to a modicum of petulance when they ask: Are the physical and biological scientists being asked to produce a comparable accounting?

The moment they do so, however, they run into further trouble. If social scientists identify biological and physical scientists as their standard, then they become vulnerable to the reproach that the latter in fact pay no attention to their classics in general education courses, let alone in research. At which point, of course, the social scientists will exclaim that, well, they really are closer to the humanistic disciplines than to the hard sciences—which in turn makes them vulnerable to the earlier reproach regarding multicultural distortion.

I see no way out of this vicious circle other than to do what one must always do when reaching an impasse on curricular choices, namely, to raise the fundamental question: what is the *educational purpose* at hand for which the texts being debated are to be selected? No text justifies itself, just as no text teaches itself. The need for ultimate justifying principles proves inescapable. Resolving that question will equip us to know not only whether classic texts should be read but, more vexing yet if the answer is positive, *which* classics should be read and *how* they should be read.

One possible principle could be that of cultural *diversity*, on grounds that exposing students to the widest possible range of human voices both stretches their humanity and equips them to live in an increasingly multicultural world. To this I believe the consensus response at Chicago would be that that is a plausible educational objective, but not one suited to ground a particular curricular sequence. Diverse human voices should be and are encountered in a variety of our generally required courses—through poetry, drama, and fiction, and through art and music (in our Humanities requirements); through acquaintance with another medium of verbal expression (in our language requirement); through encounters with documents of a world-historical culture area (in our Civilizations requirement—and our unwillingness to specify a particular civilization presumes inter alia that the voices of a Solon or a St. Augustine may be no less exotic for our students than those of an Asoka or a Lao-tse); and—in the way customarily achieved in the Soc 2 course—through anthropological accounts of exotic cultures.

Instead of diversity, one might appeal to the principle of *quality*, on grounds that a great way to educate students is to expose them to something like "the best that humans have thought and said." This was a major rationale behind the idea of constructing a curriculum around a set of Great Books, and there is much to be said for it. Such a curricular principle was seriously considered at Chicago in 1937—and then re-

jected, forcing its proponents to move to St. John's College in Annapolis in order to set up a consistent Great Books curriculum.

The Chicago faculty instead deepened their commitment to a curriculum based on acquainting students with the major forms of reasoning and expression produced within the intellectual disciplines. Quality, or excellence, remained a pervasive concern, to be sure; but *types of discipline* rather than instantiations of excellence constituted the central working principle of curricular construction. Consequently, although classics played an essential role in all the social science core sequences, they never played an exclusive role. Indeed, at times a mediocre piece of work might be deliberately inserted to make some educational point. More important, the classics were frequently accompanied by readings that represented specimens of contemporary social research: ethnographic reports, clinical interviews, lab experiments, structural analyses, and the like. This remains the dominant practice in social science core courses at Chicago today.

Affirming the principle of constructing general education curricula so as to acquaint students with generic forms of intellectual discipline yields not only a partial rationale for including the social science classics, but also suggests certain ways in which those texts should *not* be taught in these courses. For example, one should not read Durkheim's *Suicide* as a document expressing the culture of France during the Third Republic, although that may be a perfectly legitimate if not indispensable way to read it for other purposes. Nor should one read a particular work mainly with an eye to its role in the historical development of a particular research tradition, either as a source of concepts or techniques that have later been exploited in novel ways or as a source of propositions or data not yet incorporated in the mainstream literature. Instead, one should examine it as an exemplar of a generic way of raising the solving problems about society and human behavior.

At this point it is perhaps time to make the case, more forcefully than was hinted at above, that if our objective is to represent the disciplines of the social sciences then we should not waste time on the classic texts today. Proponents of this position would hold that, as in the natural sciences, whatever is valid in the classic texts has been incorporated into the current stock of knowledge in the disciplines; whatever has not been incorporated has been omitted because it is not valid; and spending time on archaic formulations detracts us from attending to the most up-to-date methods and analyses. The spirit of this position found expression in the intimidating epigraph by Alfred North Whitehead which Robert Merton affixed to successive editions of his widely influential collection of essays, *Social Theory and Social Structure,* "A science which hesitates to forget its founders is lost," and in the notable memorandum

which W. F. Ogburn circulated at the University of Chicago in the early 1950s, urging his colleagues to abstain from scholarship on earlier texts and likening the use of such texts in instruction to teaching about alchemy in chemistry courses.[8]

Against such a position, I would argue that the social science classics remain essential today both for educational and collegial functions. To convey a sense of the way social scientists think today necessarily requires us to represent a wide variety of contending doctrines, such as—to take a random example—divergent interpretations of the nature and significance of conflict in human relations. There is no better way to gain access to the substance of these contending positions than to examine each in its locus classicus, the point where it was freshly elaborated with keen awareness of its necessary premises. What is more, examination of divergent classic formulations immunizes us against a false sense of closure when complacency reigns. M. H. Abrams has celebrated the classics of literary criticism in terms well suited for arguing that the mission of the social sciences is in good part to sustain a rich variety of speculative instruments for addressing the human condition: "A humane study that forgets its founders is impoverished," writes Abrams; "a great critic is subject to correction and supplementation, but is never entirely outmoded; and progress in fact depends on our maintaining the perspectives and the insights of the past as live options, lest we fall into contemporary narrowness of view, or be doomed to repeat old errors and laboriously to rediscover ancient insights."[9]

It is even possible to argue that in spite of indisputable advances in techniques of observation and analysis, contemporary work in the social sciences has never surpassed—in some respects, has never equaled—the disciplined intellectual work of the major classics. While this may not be true for most of economics, demography, and experimental psychology, it is arguably the case in anthropology, political science, psychoanalytic psychology, and sociology. Speaking of the sociological tradition, for example, Edward Shils has long argued that although present-day work in sociology exhibits strikingly superior scientific qualities compared to that of earlier generations, the classics possess "permanent relevance" for contemporary sociologists. This is so because they afford access to certain primal realities of social life that cannot be represented by abstract formulas but can only be appre-

8. The Ogburn memorandum was sent on August 12, 1952, to Dean Ralph W. Tyler, and can be located in the Philip M. Hauser Papers and Addenda, box 14, folder 11, Department of Special Collections, Joseph Regenstein Library, University of Chicago. See also Stephen Turner, "Salvaging Sociology's Past," *ASA Footnotes* 19 (5 May 1991): 6.

9. M. H. Abrams, "What's the Use of Theorizing about the Arts?" in *In Search of Literary Theory*, ed. M. W. Bloomfield (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), 52.

hended through the revelation of deeply personal experiences by persons of exceptional sensibility and intellect.[10]

Beyond their function as exemplars of divergent viewpoints and disciplined intuition, moreover, the social science classics figure as role models for supradisciplinary and transgenerational conversation. The fact is, Rousseau *was* addressing Hobbes; Marx *did* debate Adam Smith, and Weber, Marx; Durkheim *was* engaged in dialogue with Comte and with Spencer; and Malinowski *did* debate Freud. I have argued elsewhere that the social science community has been become so specialized and fragmented that its morale as a professional intellectual community has become jeopardized, and that heightened awareness of our classical heritage "may help us to overcome the parochial isolation of our divided specialities and to temper the exorbitant and sterile polemics of many of our scholarly exchanges."[11] However that may be, the demonstration of such conversations among the classics, and the elicitation of comparable discourse among their readers by competent teachers, remains, I am convinced, one of the most enduring accomplishments of the Soc 2 experiment and one of the grounds for its continuing relevance for social scientists both as teachers and as participants in a collaborative investigative enterprise.

10. "The Calling of Sociology," in *Theories of Society,* ed. T. Parsons, E. Shils, K. Naegele, and J. Pitts (New York: Free Press, 1961). For other arguments regarding the continuing relevance of the sociological classics, see Bryan S. R. Green, "On the Evaluation of Sociological Theory," in *Philosophy of the Social Sciences,* 7 (1977):33–50; Dirk Käsler, *Klassiker des soziologischen Denkens* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1976), 1:7–17; Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (New York: Free Press, 1968), chap. 1; Robert A. Nisbet, *The Sociological Tradition* (New York: Basic Books, 1966); Edward A. Shils, *Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981); Arthur L. Stinchcombe, "Should Sociologists Forget Their Mothers and Fathers?" *American Sociologist* 17 (February 1982).

11. Donald N. Levine, "On the Heritage of Sociology," in *The Challenge of Social Control: Citizenship and Institution Building in Modern Society, Essays in Honor of Morris Janowitz,* ed. Gerald Suttles and Mayer Zald (Norwood, N.J.: Ablex, 1985), 19.

4

Chicago General Education in Social Sciences, 1931–92: The Case of Soc 2

David E. Orlinsky

I

The systematic development of general education in social sciences started at the University of Chicago with the inauguration of the New College Plan in 1931.[1] The plan required all undergraduates to pass comprehensive examinations in each of four year-long introductory general courses, and in addition to pass examinations covering a second year of general study in two of those fields. The general areas to be examined were humanities, biological sciences, physical sciences, and social sciences, following the administrative reorganization that had just been made of the University's departments into four graduate divisions. (Students were also required to take one year of English composition, and could elect three one-quarter courses.) This curriculum covered grades 13 and 14, normally the freshman and sophomore years of college. After their two years of general education, students were expected to take two more years of specialized work in one of the divisions in order to earn an A.B. or S.B. degree.

The Introductory General Course in the Social Sciences, listed simply as "Social Sciences I" in the 1931–32 *Announcements,* was designed by Harry D. Gideonse (Economics), Jerome Kerwin (Political Science), and Louis Wirth (Sociology). The course sought to give students an integrated understanding of the problems of contemporary society by tracing the parallel evolution of economic, social, and political institutions, from the folk society of the medieval manor, through the vicissitudes of the Industrial Revolution, to the urban industrial societies of the twentieth century.

This course has continued through various transformations for six decades. As part of a major curricular change in 1942, Social Sciences I became the second in a required three-year social science course se-

1. C. S. Boucher and A. J. Brumbaugh, *The Chicago College Plan,* 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935).